Tuesday, November 27, 2007

Annapolis Foreign Policy Watch

If Gov. Martin O'Malley can negotiate peace between the House of Delegates and the Senate, I suppose we are truly living in wondrous times, so why shouldn't peace be made between the Israelis and the Palestinians in Annapolis?

On the other hand, the city's role in the crafting of the Constitution is only guardedly auspicious. When delegates from met in Annapolis in 1786, they agreed that they would meet next year in Philadelphia. Of the thirteen colonies, only five states sent delegates. Maryland, showing the leadership that would leave Virginia as the mother of presidents and Maryland as the mother of Spiro Agnew, did not send delegates to the Convention held in its own capital.

Low expectations are clearly the order of the day in Annapolis. While the general shape of a settlement has been apparent for sometime, no one seems to know how to get from here to there. The main players in the drama are all weakened leaders. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert can only envy President George Bush's dismal approval ratings. One poll showed that 65% of Israelis think that Olmert has no mandate to go to Annapolis and make major concessions; a majority want him removed from office. Such things matter in a democracy and Israeli is a lively, if fractious, one.

Meanwhile, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is really only president in the West Bank as Hamas rules the Gaza Strip. The Gaza strip is small but extremely densely populated, containing over one-third of the Palestinian population. Abbas, as affable as Arab leaders appear to come, is weak too and any willingness to compromise, crucial to negotiations, will be interpreted as weakness. Hamas is already declaring that Abbas has no right to concede an inch of Palestine.

The future is even more dismal. Likud Leader Benjamin Netanyahu appears like to win the next Israeli elections and return as a prime minister opposed to the peace process. It seems unlikely that Abbas could be replaced by a leader more willing to negotiate a peace settlement.

The problems of negotiating peace remain high even leaving aside the current dearth of leadership. Bernard Lewis outlined the problems on the Palestinian side in an opinion piece heavily on realism which is needed here even if it can be as unwelcome as a splash of cold water in the morning:

The first question (one might think it is obvious but apparently not) is, "What is the conflict about?" There are basically two possibilities: that it is about the size of Israel, or about its existence.

If the issue is about the size of Israel, then we have a straightforward border problem, like Alsace-Lorraine or Texas. That is to say, not easy, but possible to solve in the long run, and to live with in the meantime.

If, on the other hand, the issue is the existence of Israel, then clearly it is insoluble by negotiation. There is no compromise position between existing and not existing, and no conceivable government of Israel is going to negotiate on whether that country should or should not exist.

PLO and other Palestinian spokesmen have, from time to time, given formal indications of recognition of Israel in their diplomatic discourse in foreign languages. But that's not the message delivered at home in Arabic, in everything from primary school textbooks to political speeches and religious sermons. Here the terms used in Arabic denote, not the end of hostilities, but an armistice or truce, until such time that the war against Israel can be resumed with better prospects for success. Without genuine acceptance of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish State, as the more than 20 members of the Arab League exist as Arab States, or the much larger number of members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference exist as Islamic states, peace cannot be negotiated.

The second problem is that there is the lack of any sign that any Palestinian leader seems able bind his people to an agreement. Leaving aside the current question of Hamas, no Palestinian leader has shown the ability and the inclination to prevent Palestinian attacks on Israel except as part of a short-term strategy.

The Israelis also have a sizable opposition to a peace agreement for a variety of reasons as well. A small minority will even take up arms. The difference is that the Israeli government has shown the ability to enforce discipline on its own people when it desires as demonstrated by the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza.

Is it any wonder that the Bush administration is trying to keep expectations low?